Ten common misunderstandings in Politics
By Mike Pattison
Classical liberal philosophers supported the notion of democracy. Many didn’t propose democracy as we understand it today, fearing that universal suffrage would create a ‘mobocracy’ in which voters determined policy out of ‘self-interest’ rather than the wider ‘national interest’. Many classical liberals imposed limits on democracy. Locke advocated a ‘property franchise’, believing that property ownership was a measure of achievement and therefore intellect. Some classical liberals also supported slavery on the grounds that slaves were not ‘citizens’
Marx was a Marxist. In fact he said “If anything is certain, it is that I myself am not a Marxist.” What he believed was that he had discovered an inevitable and immutable truth about the course of history: that it would end in communism. To that extent he was more a dispassionate observer of social and political change, although he did urge ‘workers of all lands unite’. His quote lends further ‘objectivity’ to his ‘scientific’ theory.
Disraeli coined the phrase ‘One Nation Conservatism’. He didn’t. He wrote a novel, Sybil, about ‘two nations’ in 1845, but the term One Nation Conservative was coined in the 1920s and applied to his particular brand of Conservatism.
Thatcher was the first Conservative Prime Minister whose government introduced a policy to sell off council houses. In fact Ted Heath’s government (1970-74) had that same policy, but he was not enthusiastic about implementing it.
Thatcher introduced monetarism to Britain. In fact Ted Heath first experimented with monetarism, but the consequent rising unemployment caused him to abandon the idea in his famous ‘U’ turn.
Thatcher wrote her famous ‘U-turn’ speech. She didn’t. Thatcher’s speech was written by the playwright Sir Ronald Millar and was a pun on the title of the play by Christopher Fry, The Lady’s Not for Burning (a reference which Thatcher failed to appreciate). The first part of the quote, ‘You turn if you want to’, was a clever critical allusion to Ted Heath’s U-turn on monetarism.
Thatcher was an ideologue who eschewed pragmatism. She wasn’t – entirely! She refused to privatise the NHS, despite being urged to do so by her Cabinet, and entered into talks with the IRA to begin the peace process in Northern Ireland.
Tony Blair was pioneering in changing Clause IV and rebranding Labour as ‘New Labour’. In fact, Blair was one in a long line of social democratic revisionists within the Labour Party. In the late 1950s the Labour Leader Hugh Gaitskell had tried to change Clause IV and to rename the party ‘Modern Labour’.
Marbury v Madison (1803) was the first US Supreme Court case of judicial review in which the court ‘struck down’ an action of another branch of government. It wasn’t! One scholar counts 31 cases in the Supreme Court or in State courts striking down acts for State legislatures. But it was the first significant case, made all the more so in the wake of the controversial departure of President Adams and the inauguration of Jefferson.
The US President is the most powerful man in the world. Absolutely not! Heaven knows who is, but most US Presidents are bifurcated: strong on foreign policy, weak on domestic policy. This is because of the constitutional constraints established by the framers of the constitution to ensure the rights of the States were protected. For example, Bill Clinton (a Democrat President) could not pass his flagship Healthcare bill through a Democrat controlled Congress. That simply wouldn’t happen to a British Prime Minister whose party commanded a majority in the House of Commons.
Blair, the reluctant reformer: the anatomy of constitutional reform
By Mike Pattison
It is the fate of prime ministers not to be remembered by their achievements, but for their failings and shortcomings. Think of Eden and the Suez crisis come to mind; Macmillan conjures the Profumo scandal; Callaghan, the Winter of Discontent; Heath, the miners’ strike; Thatcher, the Poll Tax; Major, sleaze; and so on. But among those most castigated for their failings, Tony Blair must surely rank high above the others. Tom Bowler’s recent biography, ‘Broken Vows’, attests to this. In particular, the war in Iraq casts a dark shadow over Blair’s premiership, summoning the Grim Reaper to scythe flat any achievements for which he might otherwise be recognised. So are there any redeeming features of Blair’s premiership?
Simon Jenkins (New Statesman, March 2016) points towards three successive electoral victories for Labour after eighteen years in the wilderness. But these are achievements for the party and not, in themselves, transformative of society. His wider social and economic achievements are hotly disputed. Child poverty was something he publicly sought to diminish, but it actually increased in the Blair years. A strong economy allowed him to invest in public services, and under Blair the UK economy grew. But arguably this was handed to him on a plate by Major’s outgoing Conservative government who eventually built the strongest post-war economy Britain has enjoyed (although this went largely unrecognised). Never truly acknowledged, it is the contribution of the Blair government to constitutional change that is perhaps most striking.
On the face of it, the constitutional reforms of Blair’s government are immense. There was the creation of devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales, the establishment of power-sharing in Northern Ireland in a revived Northern Ireland Assembly, the rebirth of the Greater London Authority and an elected London Mayor (the first of many elected mayors), the implementation of the Human Rights Act and the Freedom of Information Act, the reform of the House of Lords (removing all but 92 hereditary peers), a move towards greater separation of powers in the UK through the Constitutional Reform Act, an attempt to make political party donations and registration more transparent through the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, and proposals for a North East Assembly. New electoral systems were introduced in regional elections in Scotland, and in regional and local elections in Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as in elections to the European Parliament (although the Jenkins Commission’s proposal to change the voting system for general elections was quietly ignored). Astonishing though these changes are, Blair’s commitment to and enthusiasm for constitutional reform is surprisingly questionable.
The constitutional reforms of Blair’s government fall into three categories. The first are those reforms which had been proposed before Blair became party leader and to which the party was already publically committed. Many of these had been proposed by Blair’s predecessor, John Smith, an enthusiast of constitutional reform. They would have been implemented whoever had been leader. They include the party’s commitment to establishing devolved assembles in Scotland and Wales.
After the debacle of the 1979 Scottish devolution referendum the Labour Party threw its support behind the campaign for a Scottish Parliament. It played a significant part in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, established in 1989, which examined proposals for devolved powers to Scotland. Labour depended on its Scottish and Welsh voters for seats in Westminster and the party’s association with devolution can be seen in this context as a pragmatic imperative. In 1992 the Party’s manifesto stated: “The Scottish Parliament will have a vital role in building the competitive strength of the Scottish economy. Our new Welsh Assembly will also have important economic responsibilities.” Blair had little choice but to include the proposal to establish a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly in the 1997 manifesto. With a clear mandate for a Scottish Parliament and a slender majority in favour of a Welsh Assembly in the 1997 referendums, Blair established the new assemblies in 1998. His commitment to these changes cannot be questioned. Fearing the House of Lords might attempt to scupper the devolution proposals he initiated the referendums to secure a mandate for reform from the people of Wales and Scotland. He undoubtedly believed devolution was the right way forward, but in essence he was honouring pre-existing policies which the party had proposed before he became leader.
Similarly, the negotiation of power sharing in Northern Ireland and the revival of the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont had its origins in the years before Blair became party leader. Peace talks began under Margret Thatcher and were pursued with vigour in the Major years. In effect, in signing the Good Friday Agreement Blair was simply completing a process begun by his predecessors. Labour had also been committed to restoring a Greater London Authority since Thatcher abolished the Greater London Council in the 1980s. Though supportive of the idea, Blair was committed to creating the Authority by existing Labour policy.
The House of Lords reform is another case in point. Blair himself had little interest in the Lords reform, but it had been party policy under Smith. What ultimately convinced him about the need for reform was that the Lords had challenged his government no fewer than 38 times in its first year. Blair stated that the Conservatives were using the hereditary peers to "frustrate" and "overturn the will of the democratically elected House of Commons”. The measure, limiting hereditary peers to 92, was to be the first stage in a much more radical overhaul, but the second stage never happened.
This first category also includes the abandoned proposals for electoral reform put forward by the Jenkins Commission. Labour had been in opposition for eighteen long years and prior to the 1997 general election had been in negotiation with the Liberal Democrats about possible a coalition and electoral reform.. The party’s landslide victory in 1997 came as much of a surprise to Tony Blair as it did to many of the pundits, but having secured such a victory under the first-past-the-post system the appeal of electoral reform diminished. Blair quietly dropped the Jenkins Commission recommendations.
The second category of reforms includes those which Blair initially considered a good idea, but which he later regretted. They were intended to demonstrate New Labour’s credentials as a party of radical reform and were developed in their first days in office. The Human Rights Act (1998) and the Freedom of Information Act (2000) fall into this category and were laudable policies. The first was proposed to stem the growing unease from pressure groups such as Charter 88, which fought against the erosion of civil liberties in the UK. The Human Rights Act was also a pragmatic proposal: since the 1980s British citizens were pursuing embarrassing litigation against UK governments on issues of civil rights through the European Courts. Signing Britain up to the European Convention on Human Rights seemed a sensible, practical step, given that governments were already being held to account by the convention. The second reform, the Freedom of Information Act, was an attempt to increase the openness, and therefore the accountability, of government to the people.
But Blair later felt that the Human Rights Act constrained his fight against terrorism, routinely railing against it (Rawsley, The End of the Party), and that the Freedom of Information Act was used more by mischievous journalists than by members of the public seeking government accountability. On the FOI Blair later wrote: “Its consequences would be revolutionary; the power it handed to the…media was gigantic.” And later: “Freedom of Information. Three harmless words. I look at those words as I write them, and feel like shaking my head till it drops off my shoulders. You naive, foolish, irresponsible nincompoop. There is really no description of stupidity, no matter how vivid, that is adequate. I quake at the imbecility of it….We had legislated in the throes of power…The truth is that the FOI isn’t used, for the most part by the people. It’s used by journalists…as a weapon….Governments, like any other organisations, need to be able to discuss and decide issues with a reasonable level of confidentiality” (Blair, My Journey). Indeed, journalists used the FOI to compel Blair to publish details of dinner guests at Chequers (the Prime Minister’s country retreat), including Michael Winner and Joan Collins. Blair later described it as his worst mistake as Prime Minister
Other changes arose because Blair was persuaded by others that they were worthwhile, often because they looked radical but required little additional public spending (Hennessy et al, Developments in British Politics, Vol 9). This third category includes the ill-fated North East Assembly, an idea linked to efficiency gains and cost-savings in creating unitary authorities. This had been proposed by the Electoral Commission and taken up with alacrity by Blair’s pugilist Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott. But the referendum on such an assembly saw 78% of voters reject the idea on a 49% turnout and the proposal was scrapped along with the hopes of a wider roll-out of the scheme across the country.
Finally there was the Constitutional Reform Act (2005) which created a separate Supreme Court. Prior to 2005 the Lord Chancellor wore ‘three hats’ in the system of government: he was the lead figure of the law lords (judiciary); he presided over meetings of the Lords (legislature); and he attended Cabinet meetings (executive) All three branches of government were therefore embraced in the role of Lord Chancellor, which Montesquieu argued was wrong.
Andrew Adonis (Head of the No.10 Policy Unit) and Andrew Turnbull (Cabinet Secretary) urged Blair to reform this post, but Blair was reluctant. This was because Derry Irvine was the Lord Chancellor and, as a barrister he had been Blair’s Head of Chambers (mentor) when Blair was first accepted to the Bar. Under pressure, Blair eventually accepted the need for reform, and faced Irvine’s fury.
Initially Blair accepted that the post of Lord Chancellor should disappear altogether. There would be a new president of the Supreme Court, a new Lord Speaker, and the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs would assume the executive functions in Cabinet (the role was replaced by the Secretary of State for Justice in 2007). But it was soon realised that the office of the Lord Chancellor was mentioned in over 5000 pieces of legislation. It could not be abolished without rewriting the legislation. So the title was retained in Cabinet and eventually became part of the role of the Justice Secretary. The Constitutional Reform Act was passed in 2005, including provision for a new independent Judicial Appointments Commission, and the Supreme Court was finally opened in 2009
On the face of it, therefore, the Blair government enacted major constitutional reform. But delve deeper and the motives behind the reform are more complex than simple radical zeal. Blair was many things: on domestic policy he was opportunistic, on foreign affairs he was reactionary, but instinctively on constitutional matters he was, as Andrew Rawsley suggests, ‘instinctively a constitutional conservative’. Yes, there were sweeping constitutional reforms introduced by Blair’s government. But, in the end, these were often achieved not because of, but despite, Tony Blair.
Why did the Post-War consensus crumble in the 1970s ?
By Izzy Kai
In The People’s War, Angus Calder argues that the final phases of the war led to the creation of government forming “a consensus which became the basis of the post-war welfare state.”[1] On one hand, the consensus needed to happen, Britain was a war-torn country, wracking up debt and needed to provide for their citizens. Even without Atlee and William Beveridge, there would have been a degree of consensus between the predominant political parties. On the other hand, what will also be intertwined into this essay is whether the consensus actually existed and if it did, whether it was as long lasting as many historians claim. This theory is based on Ben Pimlott’s the “Myth of Consensus”[2] which explains, “consensus is a mirage.”[3] This essay aims to address firstly, what led to the crumbling of the post-war consensus, then why it crumbled and what the consequences of the crumbling were as well as that the central reason for the crumbling of the consensus is the individuals involved and how they conflicted with one another.
The first section of this essay will seek to address what the consensus was and the impacts it had on Britain. Anthony Seldon defines consensus as an “agreement on the broad framework or on the parameters in which party disagreement would take place”, Seldon recognises that “between the 1940s and mid-1970s” that policies did alternate, “but usually within a defined band.”[4] In The Road to 1945[5], Paul Addison stresses the success of the wartime government in working in collaboration between 1940 –45 and how this contributed to further successes of the postwar consensus. Both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party saw a “gradual shift towards increasing state intervention in domestic affairs.”[6] There was further evidence of consensus in the “pragmatism rather than socialism”[7] stance in terms of foreign policy in which Labour became less pacifistic to take a more traditional approach to security against possible aggressor states post-war, aligning with the Conservatives. However, this notion of “pragmatism” could in essence sum up the so-called post-war consensus. Pragmatic thinking involves dealing with an issue sensibly and based on practicality. If varying members of Parliament from different parties were to clash whilst trying to organise a war torn country there would be no progress, thus, the “post-war consensus” may have never actually existed but instead just have been a small period of agreement over policy immediately after WWII.
However, consensus politics is evident in the Churchill government of 1951 since they retained and accepted Atlee’s new welfare state, in turn accepting the post-war consensus. Yet this could again be accepting what had already been put in place, the country had adapted and it makes a new government appear weak to change legislation recently put through. Then again as Seldon points out “the fact that Conservative leaders discussed cutting back the welfare state is irrelevant.”[8] Furthermore, even though the Conservatives were more enthusiastic to use monetary policy than Labour, the economic policy constructed was still directed at the same end, towards the “maintenance of full employment in a balance economy.”[9] Since the Conservatives continued and to an extent supported Labour’s welfare state post-war, this largely disproves Nicholas Deakin’s argument that the “‘real’ consensus existed from 1943 – 1948.”[10] Moreover throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Conservative Party accepted having more control over the economy rather than using laissez-faire economics, thus they were confessing to the left’s economic policies and in turn the post-war consensus. Vernon Bogdanor highlights the point that this allowed Harold Wilson to come to Downing Street in 1964 “who was committed to planning and to an incomes policy.”[11] It also ensured that trade unions would still be on side since they were more trusting of the Labour than of the Conservatives. This section has explained what the consensus was and the impact it had on the decisions of government. What will now be moved on to, the main crux of the essay, are the factors which contributed to the eventual crumbling of the postwar consensus.
Focusing on Kavanagh’s claim that the consensus lasted up until the 1970s, the following section of the essay will discuss the factors that contributed to the crumbling of the consensus and effects as well as, contradictions that it didn’t exist at all, or was short lived. David Dutton claims that the 1960s were when “the post-war consensus first began to break down.”[12] Dutton identifies that since approximately 1947 both political parties had pursued “broadly Keynesian”[13] policies. However by the 1960s Keynesian economics couldn’t produce both growth and full employment as well as stable price levels.[14] Thus economic factors greatly contributed to the crumbling of the postwar consensus. What is also noticeable is that the Conservative Party first started to deviate from centrist politics, members of the Labour party were also outspoken against consensus, most notably Tony Benn however it began from the right side of politics. Enoch Powell resigned from the Treasury in 1958 over the issue of the EEC, and gained support from two MPs, who would go on to be prominent figures in Thatcher’s cabinets in the 1980s.[15] Ben Pimlott in comparison believes that the key date is 1951 in which Labour lost power. Pimlott argues that if consensus cannot be found among the party elites of Westminster, such as Tony Benn, then it can be “found less among party followers, who he believes were more divided in the 1950s and 1960s than in the 1980s after consensus had allegedly finished.”[16] Thus party member deviance and behaviour is also an important factor in the crumbling of the postwar consensus.
Differing views on entrance to the EEC and independence of Commonwealth countries also caused fragmentation within the post-war consensus. Sir Anthony Eden, the ringleader of the Suez Canal crisis 1956, was “at root an intensely patriotic man, who thought Britain’s Commonwealth links far more important than deeper entanglements with Europe.”[17] Yet it was not only the Conservative party that had issues with membership to Europe, Hugh Gaitskell, felt strong ties to the Commonwealth and said that if Britain were to enter the EEC it would be “the end of a thousand years of history.”[18] Powell and Keith Joseph of the Conservatives as well as Tony Benn of Labour also had qualms with the proposition of joining the EEC thus causing internal divisions within both parties. This in turn reiterates Pimlott’s “Myth of Consensus” theory which explains that “consensus is a mirage”[19] claiming that there is little evidence that political actors regarded themselves as part of the consensus post-war. What gives further evidence to the myth of consensus is Phillip Williams. Who has argued that there has been too much focus on the “Butskellism” consensus between Labour’s Hugh Gaitskell and the Conservative’s Rab Butler. Williams argues that Gaitskell was socialist in his thinking, hence the election defeat of Labour in 1951. William’s argument again comes down to political individuals and how they perceived the consensus to be, in most instances it appears negative.
Edward Heath introduced a statutory incomes policy in 1972 which cause conflicts with miners in 1974. Therefore, those who made a significant proportion of Labour’s support had now lost further faith in them, proving Pimlott’s theory that without support the consensus could never have existed, another factor contributing to the crumbling. At the beginning of Heath’s campaign for Downing Street Labour were increasingly anxious about an election fought over the government versus the trade unions which would result in a Conservative landslide. Surprisingly the 1974 election led to a further turn of events and reinforced the crumbling of the post-war consensus, if it existed all together. The 1974 election resulted in the Conservative Party losing three million votes across the country and an emergence of people voting for the Liberal Party, who in total received six million votes.[20] The Liberal Party received the centrist vote which both Labour and the Conservatives had lost with the continuing break down of the consensus. The liberal vote of 1974 indicates support for the decline of the two major parties and further contributes to the crumbling since support for other parties became a significant factor in why the consensus fell away. This foreshadows Thatcher being a consequence of the consensus, rather than being a reason for it crumbling.
The “Winter of Discontent” from 1978 - 1979 involved union strikes and seemed “like a return to the bad old days of all-powerful union leaders”[21] and greatly shook up what was left of the post-war consensus. At the height of the crisis, the then Prime Minister James Callaghan stated “it is unpopular to speak up for trade unionism in this country today.”[22] He wasn’t wrong; the formal support for the unions “umbrella body”[23] resulted in a wave of pay strikes from the public sector. This apparent focus on the Trade Unions and not other communities within the electorate led to further distain of the post-war governments, since they lost crucial support. It also in turn, benefitted Margaret Thatcher who would soon become Prime Minister. This is because the fear of similar strikes was a key factor “a fear that if you voted labour, you would have the same all over again.”[24] It exemplifies the electorate realigning to different party norms and highlights the new emerging lower middle class whom Thatcher gave voice too. What was left of the consensus was lost in the past, film director Lindsay Anderson sums up the continuing unrest in her diary by stating, “the place gets more schizophrenic every day.”[25] It was like the ancient versus the new, and this ancient strategy had gotten lost in translation between the government and the new demographic of British society. This section of the essay has explained that the crumbling of the post-war consensus began very early in the process between 1945 and 1979, and was largely a result of inter-party conflict.
The final section of the essay will focus on the predominant consequences of the crumbling and how this impacted Britain. Those who emerged as a newly educated working class generation, found a leader in Thatcher who was giving voice to a community who had not been heard over the shouts and demands of the trade unions. Thatcher and the Conservatives “borrowed the clothes of left-radical politics from a decade earlier… focused on key Labour issues such as health, education and unemployment.”[26] By 1979 there were few supporters of the left or right, “who believed either party had yet found the appropriate policies to deal with Britain’s problems” many people felt that “it was perhaps that the time was ripe for a genuinely new beginning.” [27] Britain moving into the 1980s was made up of a changed social dynamic, ethical issues such as homosexuality and abortion needed to be addressed and the post-war consensus, or what was left of it, was too caught up in the past to move forward.[28]
With Pimlott’s “Myth of Consensus” theory in mind, which suggests that, “consensus is a mirage”[29] this essay has concluded that the consensus may indeed have been a form of optical illusion informed by the conditions at the time. The party elite from both ends of the political spectrum post-war had to come across as if they were agreeing on broad pieces of legislation in order to get the country stabilised once more. Almost immediately after the late 1940s influential members of parties started to become more ideologically lined and strayed away from centrist positions. This is the main reason for the break down of the post-war consensus, as soon as party elites started to move away from the consensus, as did the party supporters and the administration.
By Mike Pattison
Classical liberal philosophers supported the notion of democracy. Many didn’t propose democracy as we understand it today, fearing that universal suffrage would create a ‘mobocracy’ in which voters determined policy out of ‘self-interest’ rather than the wider ‘national interest’. Many classical liberals imposed limits on democracy. Locke advocated a ‘property franchise’, believing that property ownership was a measure of achievement and therefore intellect. Some classical liberals also supported slavery on the grounds that slaves were not ‘citizens’
Marx was a Marxist. In fact he said “If anything is certain, it is that I myself am not a Marxist.” What he believed was that he had discovered an inevitable and immutable truth about the course of history: that it would end in communism. To that extent he was more a dispassionate observer of social and political change, although he did urge ‘workers of all lands unite’. His quote lends further ‘objectivity’ to his ‘scientific’ theory.
Disraeli coined the phrase ‘One Nation Conservatism’. He didn’t. He wrote a novel, Sybil, about ‘two nations’ in 1845, but the term One Nation Conservative was coined in the 1920s and applied to his particular brand of Conservatism.
Thatcher was the first Conservative Prime Minister whose government introduced a policy to sell off council houses. In fact Ted Heath’s government (1970-74) had that same policy, but he was not enthusiastic about implementing it.
Thatcher introduced monetarism to Britain. In fact Ted Heath first experimented with monetarism, but the consequent rising unemployment caused him to abandon the idea in his famous ‘U’ turn.
Thatcher wrote her famous ‘U-turn’ speech. She didn’t. Thatcher’s speech was written by the playwright Sir Ronald Millar and was a pun on the title of the play by Christopher Fry, The Lady’s Not for Burning (a reference which Thatcher failed to appreciate). The first part of the quote, ‘You turn if you want to’, was a clever critical allusion to Ted Heath’s U-turn on monetarism.
Thatcher was an ideologue who eschewed pragmatism. She wasn’t – entirely! She refused to privatise the NHS, despite being urged to do so by her Cabinet, and entered into talks with the IRA to begin the peace process in Northern Ireland.
Tony Blair was pioneering in changing Clause IV and rebranding Labour as ‘New Labour’. In fact, Blair was one in a long line of social democratic revisionists within the Labour Party. In the late 1950s the Labour Leader Hugh Gaitskell had tried to change Clause IV and to rename the party ‘Modern Labour’.
Marbury v Madison (1803) was the first US Supreme Court case of judicial review in which the court ‘struck down’ an action of another branch of government. It wasn’t! One scholar counts 31 cases in the Supreme Court or in State courts striking down acts for State legislatures. But it was the first significant case, made all the more so in the wake of the controversial departure of President Adams and the inauguration of Jefferson.
The US President is the most powerful man in the world. Absolutely not! Heaven knows who is, but most US Presidents are bifurcated: strong on foreign policy, weak on domestic policy. This is because of the constitutional constraints established by the framers of the constitution to ensure the rights of the States were protected. For example, Bill Clinton (a Democrat President) could not pass his flagship Healthcare bill through a Democrat controlled Congress. That simply wouldn’t happen to a British Prime Minister whose party commanded a majority in the House of Commons.
Blair, the reluctant reformer: the anatomy of constitutional reform
By Mike Pattison
It is the fate of prime ministers not to be remembered by their achievements, but for their failings and shortcomings. Think of Eden and the Suez crisis come to mind; Macmillan conjures the Profumo scandal; Callaghan, the Winter of Discontent; Heath, the miners’ strike; Thatcher, the Poll Tax; Major, sleaze; and so on. But among those most castigated for their failings, Tony Blair must surely rank high above the others. Tom Bowler’s recent biography, ‘Broken Vows’, attests to this. In particular, the war in Iraq casts a dark shadow over Blair’s premiership, summoning the Grim Reaper to scythe flat any achievements for which he might otherwise be recognised. So are there any redeeming features of Blair’s premiership?
Simon Jenkins (New Statesman, March 2016) points towards three successive electoral victories for Labour after eighteen years in the wilderness. But these are achievements for the party and not, in themselves, transformative of society. His wider social and economic achievements are hotly disputed. Child poverty was something he publicly sought to diminish, but it actually increased in the Blair years. A strong economy allowed him to invest in public services, and under Blair the UK economy grew. But arguably this was handed to him on a plate by Major’s outgoing Conservative government who eventually built the strongest post-war economy Britain has enjoyed (although this went largely unrecognised). Never truly acknowledged, it is the contribution of the Blair government to constitutional change that is perhaps most striking.
On the face of it, the constitutional reforms of Blair’s government are immense. There was the creation of devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales, the establishment of power-sharing in Northern Ireland in a revived Northern Ireland Assembly, the rebirth of the Greater London Authority and an elected London Mayor (the first of many elected mayors), the implementation of the Human Rights Act and the Freedom of Information Act, the reform of the House of Lords (removing all but 92 hereditary peers), a move towards greater separation of powers in the UK through the Constitutional Reform Act, an attempt to make political party donations and registration more transparent through the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, and proposals for a North East Assembly. New electoral systems were introduced in regional elections in Scotland, and in regional and local elections in Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as in elections to the European Parliament (although the Jenkins Commission’s proposal to change the voting system for general elections was quietly ignored). Astonishing though these changes are, Blair’s commitment to and enthusiasm for constitutional reform is surprisingly questionable.
The constitutional reforms of Blair’s government fall into three categories. The first are those reforms which had been proposed before Blair became party leader and to which the party was already publically committed. Many of these had been proposed by Blair’s predecessor, John Smith, an enthusiast of constitutional reform. They would have been implemented whoever had been leader. They include the party’s commitment to establishing devolved assembles in Scotland and Wales.
After the debacle of the 1979 Scottish devolution referendum the Labour Party threw its support behind the campaign for a Scottish Parliament. It played a significant part in the Scottish Constitutional Convention, established in 1989, which examined proposals for devolved powers to Scotland. Labour depended on its Scottish and Welsh voters for seats in Westminster and the party’s association with devolution can be seen in this context as a pragmatic imperative. In 1992 the Party’s manifesto stated: “The Scottish Parliament will have a vital role in building the competitive strength of the Scottish economy. Our new Welsh Assembly will also have important economic responsibilities.” Blair had little choice but to include the proposal to establish a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly in the 1997 manifesto. With a clear mandate for a Scottish Parliament and a slender majority in favour of a Welsh Assembly in the 1997 referendums, Blair established the new assemblies in 1998. His commitment to these changes cannot be questioned. Fearing the House of Lords might attempt to scupper the devolution proposals he initiated the referendums to secure a mandate for reform from the people of Wales and Scotland. He undoubtedly believed devolution was the right way forward, but in essence he was honouring pre-existing policies which the party had proposed before he became leader.
Similarly, the negotiation of power sharing in Northern Ireland and the revival of the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont had its origins in the years before Blair became party leader. Peace talks began under Margret Thatcher and were pursued with vigour in the Major years. In effect, in signing the Good Friday Agreement Blair was simply completing a process begun by his predecessors. Labour had also been committed to restoring a Greater London Authority since Thatcher abolished the Greater London Council in the 1980s. Though supportive of the idea, Blair was committed to creating the Authority by existing Labour policy.
The House of Lords reform is another case in point. Blair himself had little interest in the Lords reform, but it had been party policy under Smith. What ultimately convinced him about the need for reform was that the Lords had challenged his government no fewer than 38 times in its first year. Blair stated that the Conservatives were using the hereditary peers to "frustrate" and "overturn the will of the democratically elected House of Commons”. The measure, limiting hereditary peers to 92, was to be the first stage in a much more radical overhaul, but the second stage never happened.
This first category also includes the abandoned proposals for electoral reform put forward by the Jenkins Commission. Labour had been in opposition for eighteen long years and prior to the 1997 general election had been in negotiation with the Liberal Democrats about possible a coalition and electoral reform.. The party’s landslide victory in 1997 came as much of a surprise to Tony Blair as it did to many of the pundits, but having secured such a victory under the first-past-the-post system the appeal of electoral reform diminished. Blair quietly dropped the Jenkins Commission recommendations.
The second category of reforms includes those which Blair initially considered a good idea, but which he later regretted. They were intended to demonstrate New Labour’s credentials as a party of radical reform and were developed in their first days in office. The Human Rights Act (1998) and the Freedom of Information Act (2000) fall into this category and were laudable policies. The first was proposed to stem the growing unease from pressure groups such as Charter 88, which fought against the erosion of civil liberties in the UK. The Human Rights Act was also a pragmatic proposal: since the 1980s British citizens were pursuing embarrassing litigation against UK governments on issues of civil rights through the European Courts. Signing Britain up to the European Convention on Human Rights seemed a sensible, practical step, given that governments were already being held to account by the convention. The second reform, the Freedom of Information Act, was an attempt to increase the openness, and therefore the accountability, of government to the people.
But Blair later felt that the Human Rights Act constrained his fight against terrorism, routinely railing against it (Rawsley, The End of the Party), and that the Freedom of Information Act was used more by mischievous journalists than by members of the public seeking government accountability. On the FOI Blair later wrote: “Its consequences would be revolutionary; the power it handed to the…media was gigantic.” And later: “Freedom of Information. Three harmless words. I look at those words as I write them, and feel like shaking my head till it drops off my shoulders. You naive, foolish, irresponsible nincompoop. There is really no description of stupidity, no matter how vivid, that is adequate. I quake at the imbecility of it….We had legislated in the throes of power…The truth is that the FOI isn’t used, for the most part by the people. It’s used by journalists…as a weapon….Governments, like any other organisations, need to be able to discuss and decide issues with a reasonable level of confidentiality” (Blair, My Journey). Indeed, journalists used the FOI to compel Blair to publish details of dinner guests at Chequers (the Prime Minister’s country retreat), including Michael Winner and Joan Collins. Blair later described it as his worst mistake as Prime Minister
Other changes arose because Blair was persuaded by others that they were worthwhile, often because they looked radical but required little additional public spending (Hennessy et al, Developments in British Politics, Vol 9). This third category includes the ill-fated North East Assembly, an idea linked to efficiency gains and cost-savings in creating unitary authorities. This had been proposed by the Electoral Commission and taken up with alacrity by Blair’s pugilist Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott. But the referendum on such an assembly saw 78% of voters reject the idea on a 49% turnout and the proposal was scrapped along with the hopes of a wider roll-out of the scheme across the country.
Finally there was the Constitutional Reform Act (2005) which created a separate Supreme Court. Prior to 2005 the Lord Chancellor wore ‘three hats’ in the system of government: he was the lead figure of the law lords (judiciary); he presided over meetings of the Lords (legislature); and he attended Cabinet meetings (executive) All three branches of government were therefore embraced in the role of Lord Chancellor, which Montesquieu argued was wrong.
Andrew Adonis (Head of the No.10 Policy Unit) and Andrew Turnbull (Cabinet Secretary) urged Blair to reform this post, but Blair was reluctant. This was because Derry Irvine was the Lord Chancellor and, as a barrister he had been Blair’s Head of Chambers (mentor) when Blair was first accepted to the Bar. Under pressure, Blair eventually accepted the need for reform, and faced Irvine’s fury.
Initially Blair accepted that the post of Lord Chancellor should disappear altogether. There would be a new president of the Supreme Court, a new Lord Speaker, and the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs would assume the executive functions in Cabinet (the role was replaced by the Secretary of State for Justice in 2007). But it was soon realised that the office of the Lord Chancellor was mentioned in over 5000 pieces of legislation. It could not be abolished without rewriting the legislation. So the title was retained in Cabinet and eventually became part of the role of the Justice Secretary. The Constitutional Reform Act was passed in 2005, including provision for a new independent Judicial Appointments Commission, and the Supreme Court was finally opened in 2009
On the face of it, therefore, the Blair government enacted major constitutional reform. But delve deeper and the motives behind the reform are more complex than simple radical zeal. Blair was many things: on domestic policy he was opportunistic, on foreign affairs he was reactionary, but instinctively on constitutional matters he was, as Andrew Rawsley suggests, ‘instinctively a constitutional conservative’. Yes, there were sweeping constitutional reforms introduced by Blair’s government. But, in the end, these were often achieved not because of, but despite, Tony Blair.
Why did the Post-War consensus crumble in the 1970s ?
By Izzy Kai
In The People’s War, Angus Calder argues that the final phases of the war led to the creation of government forming “a consensus which became the basis of the post-war welfare state.”[1] On one hand, the consensus needed to happen, Britain was a war-torn country, wracking up debt and needed to provide for their citizens. Even without Atlee and William Beveridge, there would have been a degree of consensus between the predominant political parties. On the other hand, what will also be intertwined into this essay is whether the consensus actually existed and if it did, whether it was as long lasting as many historians claim. This theory is based on Ben Pimlott’s the “Myth of Consensus”[2] which explains, “consensus is a mirage.”[3] This essay aims to address firstly, what led to the crumbling of the post-war consensus, then why it crumbled and what the consequences of the crumbling were as well as that the central reason for the crumbling of the consensus is the individuals involved and how they conflicted with one another.
The first section of this essay will seek to address what the consensus was and the impacts it had on Britain. Anthony Seldon defines consensus as an “agreement on the broad framework or on the parameters in which party disagreement would take place”, Seldon recognises that “between the 1940s and mid-1970s” that policies did alternate, “but usually within a defined band.”[4] In The Road to 1945[5], Paul Addison stresses the success of the wartime government in working in collaboration between 1940 –45 and how this contributed to further successes of the postwar consensus. Both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party saw a “gradual shift towards increasing state intervention in domestic affairs.”[6] There was further evidence of consensus in the “pragmatism rather than socialism”[7] stance in terms of foreign policy in which Labour became less pacifistic to take a more traditional approach to security against possible aggressor states post-war, aligning with the Conservatives. However, this notion of “pragmatism” could in essence sum up the so-called post-war consensus. Pragmatic thinking involves dealing with an issue sensibly and based on practicality. If varying members of Parliament from different parties were to clash whilst trying to organise a war torn country there would be no progress, thus, the “post-war consensus” may have never actually existed but instead just have been a small period of agreement over policy immediately after WWII.
However, consensus politics is evident in the Churchill government of 1951 since they retained and accepted Atlee’s new welfare state, in turn accepting the post-war consensus. Yet this could again be accepting what had already been put in place, the country had adapted and it makes a new government appear weak to change legislation recently put through. Then again as Seldon points out “the fact that Conservative leaders discussed cutting back the welfare state is irrelevant.”[8] Furthermore, even though the Conservatives were more enthusiastic to use monetary policy than Labour, the economic policy constructed was still directed at the same end, towards the “maintenance of full employment in a balance economy.”[9] Since the Conservatives continued and to an extent supported Labour’s welfare state post-war, this largely disproves Nicholas Deakin’s argument that the “‘real’ consensus existed from 1943 – 1948.”[10] Moreover throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Conservative Party accepted having more control over the economy rather than using laissez-faire economics, thus they were confessing to the left’s economic policies and in turn the post-war consensus. Vernon Bogdanor highlights the point that this allowed Harold Wilson to come to Downing Street in 1964 “who was committed to planning and to an incomes policy.”[11] It also ensured that trade unions would still be on side since they were more trusting of the Labour than of the Conservatives. This section has explained what the consensus was and the impact it had on the decisions of government. What will now be moved on to, the main crux of the essay, are the factors which contributed to the eventual crumbling of the postwar consensus.
Focusing on Kavanagh’s claim that the consensus lasted up until the 1970s, the following section of the essay will discuss the factors that contributed to the crumbling of the consensus and effects as well as, contradictions that it didn’t exist at all, or was short lived. David Dutton claims that the 1960s were when “the post-war consensus first began to break down.”[12] Dutton identifies that since approximately 1947 both political parties had pursued “broadly Keynesian”[13] policies. However by the 1960s Keynesian economics couldn’t produce both growth and full employment as well as stable price levels.[14] Thus economic factors greatly contributed to the crumbling of the postwar consensus. What is also noticeable is that the Conservative Party first started to deviate from centrist politics, members of the Labour party were also outspoken against consensus, most notably Tony Benn however it began from the right side of politics. Enoch Powell resigned from the Treasury in 1958 over the issue of the EEC, and gained support from two MPs, who would go on to be prominent figures in Thatcher’s cabinets in the 1980s.[15] Ben Pimlott in comparison believes that the key date is 1951 in which Labour lost power. Pimlott argues that if consensus cannot be found among the party elites of Westminster, such as Tony Benn, then it can be “found less among party followers, who he believes were more divided in the 1950s and 1960s than in the 1980s after consensus had allegedly finished.”[16] Thus party member deviance and behaviour is also an important factor in the crumbling of the postwar consensus.
Differing views on entrance to the EEC and independence of Commonwealth countries also caused fragmentation within the post-war consensus. Sir Anthony Eden, the ringleader of the Suez Canal crisis 1956, was “at root an intensely patriotic man, who thought Britain’s Commonwealth links far more important than deeper entanglements with Europe.”[17] Yet it was not only the Conservative party that had issues with membership to Europe, Hugh Gaitskell, felt strong ties to the Commonwealth and said that if Britain were to enter the EEC it would be “the end of a thousand years of history.”[18] Powell and Keith Joseph of the Conservatives as well as Tony Benn of Labour also had qualms with the proposition of joining the EEC thus causing internal divisions within both parties. This in turn reiterates Pimlott’s “Myth of Consensus” theory which explains that “consensus is a mirage”[19] claiming that there is little evidence that political actors regarded themselves as part of the consensus post-war. What gives further evidence to the myth of consensus is Phillip Williams. Who has argued that there has been too much focus on the “Butskellism” consensus between Labour’s Hugh Gaitskell and the Conservative’s Rab Butler. Williams argues that Gaitskell was socialist in his thinking, hence the election defeat of Labour in 1951. William’s argument again comes down to political individuals and how they perceived the consensus to be, in most instances it appears negative.
Edward Heath introduced a statutory incomes policy in 1972 which cause conflicts with miners in 1974. Therefore, those who made a significant proportion of Labour’s support had now lost further faith in them, proving Pimlott’s theory that without support the consensus could never have existed, another factor contributing to the crumbling. At the beginning of Heath’s campaign for Downing Street Labour were increasingly anxious about an election fought over the government versus the trade unions which would result in a Conservative landslide. Surprisingly the 1974 election led to a further turn of events and reinforced the crumbling of the post-war consensus, if it existed all together. The 1974 election resulted in the Conservative Party losing three million votes across the country and an emergence of people voting for the Liberal Party, who in total received six million votes.[20] The Liberal Party received the centrist vote which both Labour and the Conservatives had lost with the continuing break down of the consensus. The liberal vote of 1974 indicates support for the decline of the two major parties and further contributes to the crumbling since support for other parties became a significant factor in why the consensus fell away. This foreshadows Thatcher being a consequence of the consensus, rather than being a reason for it crumbling.
The “Winter of Discontent” from 1978 - 1979 involved union strikes and seemed “like a return to the bad old days of all-powerful union leaders”[21] and greatly shook up what was left of the post-war consensus. At the height of the crisis, the then Prime Minister James Callaghan stated “it is unpopular to speak up for trade unionism in this country today.”[22] He wasn’t wrong; the formal support for the unions “umbrella body”[23] resulted in a wave of pay strikes from the public sector. This apparent focus on the Trade Unions and not other communities within the electorate led to further distain of the post-war governments, since they lost crucial support. It also in turn, benefitted Margaret Thatcher who would soon become Prime Minister. This is because the fear of similar strikes was a key factor “a fear that if you voted labour, you would have the same all over again.”[24] It exemplifies the electorate realigning to different party norms and highlights the new emerging lower middle class whom Thatcher gave voice too. What was left of the consensus was lost in the past, film director Lindsay Anderson sums up the continuing unrest in her diary by stating, “the place gets more schizophrenic every day.”[25] It was like the ancient versus the new, and this ancient strategy had gotten lost in translation between the government and the new demographic of British society. This section of the essay has explained that the crumbling of the post-war consensus began very early in the process between 1945 and 1979, and was largely a result of inter-party conflict.
The final section of the essay will focus on the predominant consequences of the crumbling and how this impacted Britain. Those who emerged as a newly educated working class generation, found a leader in Thatcher who was giving voice to a community who had not been heard over the shouts and demands of the trade unions. Thatcher and the Conservatives “borrowed the clothes of left-radical politics from a decade earlier… focused on key Labour issues such as health, education and unemployment.”[26] By 1979 there were few supporters of the left or right, “who believed either party had yet found the appropriate policies to deal with Britain’s problems” many people felt that “it was perhaps that the time was ripe for a genuinely new beginning.” [27] Britain moving into the 1980s was made up of a changed social dynamic, ethical issues such as homosexuality and abortion needed to be addressed and the post-war consensus, or what was left of it, was too caught up in the past to move forward.[28]
With Pimlott’s “Myth of Consensus” theory in mind, which suggests that, “consensus is a mirage”[29] this essay has concluded that the consensus may indeed have been a form of optical illusion informed by the conditions at the time. The party elite from both ends of the political spectrum post-war had to come across as if they were agreeing on broad pieces of legislation in order to get the country stabilised once more. Almost immediately after the late 1940s influential members of parties started to become more ideologically lined and strayed away from centrist positions. This is the main reason for the break down of the post-war consensus, as soon as party elites started to move away from the consensus, as did the party supporters and the administration.